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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 20-1140
__________
JOHN SAVADJIAN,
Appellant
v.
MARLENE CARIDE, JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10, and
XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 3:18-cv-16381)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on September 15, 2020
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 23, 2020)
__________
OPINION *
__________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
In 2014, New Jersey’s Department of Banking and Insurance (“Department”) initiated a state administrative action against insurance agent John Savadjian. The Department
alleged that Savadjian violated various provisions of New Jersey state insurance law and
sought to revoke his insurance license. During the course of the proceedings, Marlene
Caride, the Department’s Commissioner, concluded that certain evidence Savadjian
wished excluded was authentic and, therefore, admissible, and issued a ruling to that effect.
Savadjian sued the Commissioner in her individual capacity, claiming violations of his
constitutional rights. The District Court dismissed his complaint because the Commissioner was due absolute quasi-judicial immunity. We will affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND1

In April 2014, the Department initiated a state administrative proceeding against
Savadjian. In the Order to Show Cause, the Department alleged that Savadjian had violated
various provisions of the New Jersey Insurance Producer Licensing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 17:22A-26 et seq. Savadjian contested the Order, and the Department, pursuant to the
New Jersey Administrative Procedures Act, transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. See N.J. Admin. Code
§ 1:1-3.2.

1

Because Savadjian appeals an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we draw
the facts from nonconclusory allegations in his complaint and matters of public record.
Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016).
2

In advance of the hearing, Savadjian filed a motion in limine to exclude audio recordings of telephone calls the Department alleged he had made, along with other materials
related to the recordings. The Department produced a witness to authenticate the recordings, but the witness had little knowledge of the evidence at issue. The witness could not
testify to how the evidence was obtained and preserved, nor did he supervise anyone who
did. The ALJ thus ruled that the Department could not authenticate the recordings, rendering them inadmissible.
The Department sought interlocutory review of that ruling with the Department’s
then-Acting Commissioner. App. 7; see also N.J. Admin. Code § 1:1-14.10(a) (allowing
that “an order or ruling may be reviewed interlocutorily by an agency head at the request
of a party”). That Acting Commissioner modified the ALJ’s ruling and remanded the issue
to the ALJ to allow the ALJ to develop a more thorough evidentiary record before ruling
on the authentication question.
On remand, the ALJ permitted further testimony from the authentication witness,
but found the testimony insufficient to justify admitting the recordings and related materials. The ALJ concluded that “[u]ntil [the Department] provides a witness who can authenticate these documents and provide a residuum of legal and competent evidence to prove
that Savadjian made the calls, . . . these documents will remain inadmissible and will not
be admitted into evidence.” App. 59-60. The Department again sought interlocutory review by the Commissioner of the ALJ’s inadmissibility ruling.
On the second interlocutory review, Commissioner Caride issued a decision concluding that the Department had satisfied the requirements for authentication and remanded
3

the matter to the ALJ to admit the evidence into the proceedings. App. 120-21. Savadjian
appealed Commissioner Caride’s decision to the New Jersey Superior Court and, also in
state court, separately sued Commissioner Caride in her individual capacity. In his suit
against Commissioner Caride, Savadjian alleged that the Commissioner violated his constitutional rights and sought monetary damages and various other relief.
Commissioner Caride removed the state court action to the District Court and
moved to dismiss, arguing that she was entitled to absolute immunity for her review and
modification of the ALJ’s evidentiary ruling. The District Court granted Commissioner
Caride’s motion. It reasoned that “Commissioner Caride performed functions comparable
to that of a judge and acted within the scope of her authority when she modified the ALJ’s
evidentiary rulings,” and “[a]ccordingly, she is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.”
App. 444. We agree.
II. DISCUSSION2
Savadjian contends the District Court erred in dismissing his suit on the ground that
Commissioner Caride was due absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Savadjian argues that
Commissioner Caride’s responsibilities are not functionally comparable to those of a judicial officer, and that she was not acting within the scope of her authority when she reviewed
and modified the evidentiary decision of the ALJ.

2

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367(a). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239,
246 (3d Cir. 2018); Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008); Dotzel v. Ashbridge,
438 F.3d 320, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2006).
4

A. The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity may immunize executive officials
performing judge-like functions
The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity provides that those “who perform functions
closely associated with the judicial process” are immune from damages suits in their individual capacities. Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985)). The doctrine protects a range of government
actors, including “those who make discretionary judgments ‘functionally comparable’ to
judges.” Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423
n.20 (1976)); see also Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 785 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly,
it has been extended to cover administrative law judges, see Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200,
and agency officials tasked with performing adjudicative functions within the executive
branch, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978).
To determine whether a government actor is due quasi-judicial immunity, “we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has
been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms
of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.” Russell, 905
F.3d at 247 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)). In making this determination, we “must consider whether the official acted independently and what procedural
safeguards attended his/her decision-making process.” Hamilton, 322 F.3d at 785. But
absolute immunity is “strong medicine,” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230 (citation omitted), and
an “official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is
justified for the function in question,” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).

5

B. Commissioner Caride performed a duty functionally comparable to that of
a judge
In Cleavinger, the Supreme Court formulated factors “characteristic of the judicial
process” to evaluate whether a government actor’s function qualifies as “judicial” for the
purpose of determining immunity. See 474 U.S. at 202 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
Those factors include “(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform [her] functions
without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation
from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the
process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.” Id. We have remarked that these
factors are the “touchstones” of the quasi-judicial immunity inquiry. Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 631 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2011).
The District Court thoroughly examined each Cleavinger factor and soundly concluded that “on balance Commissioner Caride was performing a function comparable to
that of a judge when she issued [her ruling].” App. 435. The stakes of an administrative
proceeding like this one are high, and ensuring that the Commissioner can decide legal or
factual issues without fear of individual liability facilitates judicious decision-making. See
Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, Commissioner Caride’s
ruling was based upon the record before the ALJ, which was produced through an adversarial process in which procedural safeguards were followed. See App. 437.
Commissioner Caride’s evidentiary ruling also was constrained by precedent and
state statutory and administrative law. She was permitted to review, reject, and modify the
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ALJ’s factual findings or legal conclusions, but in doing so had to “state with particularity
the reasons for rejecting the findings” and “make new or modified findings supported by
sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record.” App. 439 (quoting N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 52:14B-10(c)).
Commissioner Caride’s evidentiary ruling did just that. See App. 440. It describes
the evidence the Department wished admitted and the procedural background of the administrative action. App. 63-70. The ruling then articulates the legal standards that were
applied by the ALJ, App. 70-79, details each party’s position as to each piece of evidence
sought to be admitted, App. 80-93, and finally explains the legal and factual bases supporting the admission of each piece of contested evidence, App. 93-121.
Finally, the process that led to the Commissioner’s ruling was quintessentially adversarial and correctable on appeal. Savadjian and the Department were given “an opportunity for [a] hearing after reasonable notice” where, before an ALJ, they could “present
evidence and argument on all issues involved.”

App. 440 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 52:14B-9(a), (c)). Both parties were able to direct and cross-examine witnesses, see App.
29-39, file pleadings, and “present argument to the head of the agency” where the ALJ’s
ruling was unfavorable, App. 440 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14B-10(c)). And Savadjian
was entitled to appeal the Commissioner’s ruling to the Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court, see App. 442, a right he exercised right around the same time he
initiated this action.
Savadjian observes that the Commissioner “serves at the pleasure of the Governor”
and, thus, “presumably can be removed from office with or without cause.” Appellant Br.
7

22 (internal brackets and citation omitted) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:1-2(a)).

To

Savadjian, the possibility that the Commissioner may be removed without cause places her
“under obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of [the Department] and
the State of New Jersey.” Id.
We cannot quarrel with that assertion, and neither did the District Court. See App.
438-39 (noting that “Commissioner Caride has identified no other provisions or rules that
might insulate her office against political pressure in the context of reviewing ALJ decisions”). Serving at the pleasure of the Governor certainly exposes the Commissioner to
various political pressures. But, as the District Court found, the impact of any potential
political pressure Commissioner Caride may have encountered was blunted by the procedural safeguards present in the administrative proceeding and by the availability of an appeal. See App. 438-39.
In all, examination and application of the Cleavinger factors support the District
Court’s conclusion that Commissioner Caride satisfied her burden to show that she was
serving a function comparable to a judge when she issued her evidentiary ruling.
C. Commissioner Caride was acting within the scope of her authority in reviewing and modifying the ALJ’s evidentiary determination
Our conclusion that Commissioner Caride was performing functions comparable to
those of a judge does not end the inquiry. Once a court deems that a public official performs functions comparable to those of a judge, that official will be subject to liability only
if she “acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)); see
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also Russell, 905 F.3d at 247 (“Even a judge will not enjoy immunity for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in her judicial capacity, or for judicial actions taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets
omitted)).
Savadjian claims that Commissioner Caride’s review and modification of the ALJ’s
evidentiary ruling “exceeded the bounds of her authority.” Appellant Br. 25. Specifically,
Savadjian argues that Commissioner Caride “ignored established precedent placing limits
on her authority,” and that, “under established law, [she was] not empowered to disregard
the credibility and evidentiary findings of the ALJ.” Id. at 27. For support, Savadjian cites
to a string of New Jersey cases for the proposition that “the ALJ, as the gatekeeper of
evidence . . . is better suited than an agency head . . . to evaluate the credibility, authenticity, and admissibility of proffered evidence.” Id. at 25-27.
Savadjian’s premise may well be true, but his conclusion does not follow. Certainly
in most instances the ALJ, as evidentiary gatekeeper, is better suited to make credibility,
authenticity, and admissibility determinations, much like a district court judge is better
suited to perform those kinds of tasks than we are. But, simply put, New Jersey law authorizes the precise actions taken by Commissioner Caride here. Parties to an administrative proceeding are entitled to a “recommended report and decision” by an ALJ. N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 52:14B-10(c). The ALJ’s decision “may be adopted, modified or rejected by (the
head of the agency), who by law is empowered to make a final decision in th[e] matter.”
N.J. Admin. Code § 1:1-18.3(c)(12). The recommended decision must be filed with the
agency head, who then is authorized to “adopt, reject or modify” the recommendations of
9

the ALJ. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14B-10(c), (d); see also N.J. Admin. Code § 1:1-18.6(a)
(stating that “the agency head may enter an order or a final decision adopting, rejecting or
modifying the initial decision”). The agency head may also grant interlocutory review of
decisions by the ALJ at the request of a party. N.J. Admin. Code § 1:1-14.10.
The record demonstrates that the administrative proceeding charted this exact
course, and, therefore, Commissioner Caride cannot be said to have acted beyond the scope
of her authority in taking actions expressly permitted by New Jersey statutory and administrative law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court.
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